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The Governance  of
Agricultural Trade
Perspectives  from the 1940's
David W. Skully*
In  many quarters the point was made that
once you get started on a thing of this sort
there is no end to it.
Henry A. Wallace on the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933  (1934a)
Introduction
Opportunities  to rewrite the rules of the game of international  relations
are rare.  They occur most often in the wake of a decisive war, because
the victor  can dictate or negotiate with maximum leverage the terms  of
the peace.  The process of rewriting and enforcing  the rules of play is
analyzed  by scholars of international  relations  in terms of regimes and
hegemons.  Crudely summarized,  regimes are the rules of the game and
the hegemon  is the leading power, generally  the creator  of the existing
rules and the prime mover in their enforcement.  In this  framework,  the
history of international  relations  can be viewed as the succession  of
hegemons and the regimes  they create  and attempt to maintain  (Gilpin,
1981  and  1987).
* Agriculture  and Trade Analysis Division,  Economic  Research  Service, U.S.  Department
of Agriculture.
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partial result of a lack of a clear hegemon  in the interwar period.  Great
Britain was  no  longer capable  of enforcing  the existing  rules of
international economic  and political relations,  and the United  States,
while  capable  of taking the mantle of hegemony  from Britain, refused and
pursued an isolationist  policy.  World War II resolved  the hegemons
problem.  The United  States ascended  to hegemony  during the war and,
in spite of the protests of domestic  isolationists,  assumed an
internationalist stance in most areas of international relations.
The passing of hegemony  from  Britain to the United  States was
remarkably cooperative.  Anglo-American  negotiations  on the structure  of
the postwar  order began as early as  1940, and by  1943 one can easily
distinguish the embryonic  forms of what would  become  the International
Monetary Fund [IMF],  the World Bank, and the still-born International
Trade Organization [ITO].
The United States as the new  hegemon  had the potential to initiate a  new
order, and it realized this potential in many areas.  This chapter considers
the failure  of the United States  to establish or negotiate rules  of the
game  for the conduct of agricultural  trade in the immediate postwar
period.  My argument  is that U.S. international  agricultural  economic
policy became thoroughly nationalistic in the  1930's.  To  be precise,
agricultural nationalism began on May 12,  1933,  with the passage  of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.
The rents generated  by the agricultural  programs  of the New Deal (and
later World War II)  created a  constituency which proved  too powerful to
challenge  in the postwar period.  By  the late 1930's,  almost  all analysts of
agricultural policy  took domestic  programs as  a given,  nonnegotiable
fixture of the  economic  landscape.
This self-imposed  constraint was written into the earliest proposals  for
the postwar economic  order in the form of exceptions  and waivers  for
agricultural commodities.  Then as  now,  the proposals weakened  the
United States'  credibility in its  commitment to  freer trade.  The failure  to
bind agriculture  to  a new commercial  order in the late  1940's left the
United States holding an umbrella  over the activities  of agricultural
nationalists  in other nations.  Indeed, the U.S.  failure to promote
international rules allowed  its domestic  agricultural policy to  unilaterally
disrupt international markets, and these insouciant  actions  induced
defensive  nationalist  policies abroad.  From  this perspective, Americans
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Japan as the sincerest form of flattery.
The New  Deal  and Agricultural Nationalism
[T]he  isolationist and restrictionist aspects of  foreign
economic policy since 1934 have been directly related to
agricultural programs.  In practically  every instance the need
for the interference  with trade has grown  out of the
particular needs of a specific  agricultural program.
D. Gale Johnson  (1950)
The year  1933 marks a watershed  in U.S. domestic  economic policy and
in U.S. commercial policy.  In domestic economic  affairs, the Roosevelt
administration broke with  150 years  of relatively laissez  faire domestic
policy and attempted to inaugurate a corporatist or state-managed
economy.  In contrast, Roosevelt's  appointment of freetrader  Cordell Hull
as Secretary of State was an attempt to break with  150 years of
protectionism  and isolationism  in commercial  policy.  These two
decisions,  initiated in Roosevelt's  first  100 days, set  in motion  two
opposing  forces which have collided ever since.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA)  and the National Industrial
Recovery Act  (NIRA) were radical innovations.  They granted  the
Federal Government considerable  discretion  to intervene  in domestic
markets.  Industrialists  strongly resisted the NIRA.  In contrast,  most of
agriculture welcomed  the AAA.  In  1935, the Supreme  Court found both
laws unconstitutional.  NIRA faded  away, never to be resurrected, but the
AAA was quickly repackaged  through the joint efforts of agricultural
interests and  USDA and passed by  Congress.  The AAA of 1933 gave
USDA several  instruments with which  to raise farm prices and incomes.
The ability of Secretary of Agriculture  Henry A. Wallace  and others at
USDA to adapt their policy instrument  choices to  meet shifting political
pressures ensured the survival  of Government  control of agriculture.
The AAA represented  partial fulfillment of the demand by many
agricultural  groups in the  1920's for some form of two-price  policy.  Two-
price policies were ultimately  linked to the U.S. tariff schedule.  U.S.
tariffs were raised sharply following World  War  I in the Fordney-
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Hawley  tariff of 1930.  In reaction to higher industrial prices  and falling
prices on world  markets, farmers began  to demand a  "fair price" for their
products.  These  prices were identified with parity, usually defined  as the
terms of trade which  were obtained between  farm  products and industrial
products in the early  1910's.1  Agricultural interests might have been
placated with tariffs on farm products which would  have resulted in parity
with industrial products.  However,  the United States was  a net exporter
of most  of the agricultural products it produced,  rending the tariff an
ineffective  policy  instrument.  The  demand then was  for a policy which
would  make "the tariff effective  for agriculture."  Agricultural producers
also  felt  that agricultural markets were more volatile  than markets for
manufactures, so  there was a further demand for insulation from the
international market and the external policy and price shocks  it
transmitted to the domestic market.2
The nascent two-price  policy  of the AAA of 1933 embodied  an inherent
problem; if prices were  "stabilized"  above the market-clearing level,
surplus stocks would  result.  How to  avoid or dispose  of surpluses, given
domestic  prices, was the key policy issue.  There were several  options
open:  destruction of surpluses, production controls,  domestic dumping,
and foreign dumping.  Wallace refused  to consider  dumping surplus
commodities  on foreign  markets.  He realized  that exporting  the negative
external effects  of domestic  price support policies  would  merely  induce
retaliation and make things  even worse.3  Three policy instruments for
adjustment remained: surplus destruction,  domestic dumping, and
production controls.  All  three were tried.  Surplus destruction and plow-
ups did not play well  against the backdrop of breadlines  and fell  out of
use after the first year.  Domestic  dumping through targeted assistance
programs such  as the cotton  mattress program and food stamps emerged
later in the 1930's.  The  key  policy was  production restriction.  Under the
domestic allotment  plan,  as it was  then called,  farmers were  paid not to
Tariffs were unusually low  following  the Underwood-Simmons  Act of 1913, further
biasing  the "normalcy" of the Golden  Age,  1910-14.
This issue  is addressed in the  next  section.
s  Wallace's position that surplus disposal  on the international market is inherently self-
destructive has been recently  "rediscovered" by economists;  see Bulow,  Geanakoplos,  and
Klemperer  (1985)  and Brander and Krugman (1983).
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payment increasing, farm incomes.4
In a  1934 pamphlet, America Must Choose,  and its hard-bound sequel,
New Frontiers, Wallace  presented his case  for international cooperation
over nationalism.s  In particular, he stressed the financial risk of a policy
of commercial  nationalism.  Because U.S.  agriculture relied on exports,
for there to be a recovery in agriculture there would have to be a
recovery  in the foreign  effective  demand for U.S.  farm products.  Wallace
argued that the United  States,  as the world's leading creditor nation, must
increase  commercial  imports from its trading partners, and that this could
best be accomplished  by reducing  tariffs under the Reciprocal  Trade
Agreements  Act.  Without increased dollar revenues,  foreign  markets
would  not be able to  service their dollar-denominated  debts, nor would
they  be able to pay a fair price for U.S.  farm products.  In Wallace's view,
the Smoot-Hawley  tariff and the trade retaliation it generated shifted  the
burden of adjustment to  agriculture and necessitated  the acreage
limitations of the AAA.  The more America  turned nationalistic, he
argued, the greater the adjustment on agriculture.  Wallace  estimated that
at least 50 million acres of cropland might have to be retired under
nationalism  (Wallace,  1934a).  Lower tariffs would  allow  more
agricultural production and would result in a more equitable distribution
of adjustment.
Wallace  had little doubt about the overall comparative advantage of
American agriculture and felt  that it had little to fear and much to gain
from bilateral tariff reductions.  The bulk of the adjustment to a  more
liberal trade regime  would be borne by industrial cartels.  The  longer the
burden of adjustment was  placed  on agriculture, the deeper the
contraction of domestic demand for urban products, and the downward
economic  spiral could  easily  spill over to  military conflict.
Payments were  financed  from taxes on  processors.  This scheme  was what  the supreme
Court found  unconstitutional in 1935.  Since  1936, payments  have been  made from  general
revenue.  This approach has helped  diffuse  the cost of agricultural programs and  the political
opposition  they might provoke if financed  more directly.
Wallace's article  in Foreign Affairs  (1934a)  and his "Secretary's Report to  the President"
in the 1934 Yearbook ofAgriculture,  cover most of the points  made in America Must Choose
and are easier to find.  Alonzo  Taylor, then director of Stanford's Food Research  Institute,
critically analyzes  Wallace's 1934 writings in  The New Deal  and Foreign Trade  (1935).  Taylor
especially  notes Wallace's  neglect of monetary issues.
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international economic  relations.  However,  Wallace  faced opposition
from shorter run nationalists in USDA.  George Peek was Wallace's
administrator  of AAA programs.  Peek, the leading proponent of the  two-
price idea of agricultural policy in the 1920's  and a former farm
implements  manufacturer, was vehemently  opposed  to production
restrictions.  Farmers should be  given  a fair price, produce all they  can
(buying implements  all the while),  and what could not be consumed  at
home should be dumped abroad.  Peek's views  and actions were  to
conflict directly with those of Wallace and Hull.
Hull's appointment as Secretary of State had an immediate effect on the
conduct of U.S. commercial  policy,  Roosevelt  and Hull had to  contend
with the repercussions  of the exceptionally  protectionist Smoot-Hawley
tariff of 1930.  Most U.S.  trading partners retaliated with tariffs designed
to discriminate against U.S.  products, especially  agricultural commodities,
and many quantitative restrictions were tightened,  especially  the system of
British Imperial Preferences  (Jones,  1934).  Trade imbalances  resulted in
many bilateral "balanced trade" agreements  between  trading partners.
The United  States was  then the  leading creditor nation and therefore
faced severe discrimination under balanced trade policies.
The new administration's  first opportunity to stem  the spiral of
protectionism  and bilateralism was the  1933 World Monetary and
Economic Conference  held in London by the League of Nations.  The
U.S. position at the conference  regarding trade  is easily  summarized:
economic  nationalism is self-defeating.  To  rise above  the noncooperative
solution, some  international code  of conduct and means of negotiation  is
required.  Toward  this end, Hull advocated three principles:  (1) abolish or
relax all quantitative restrictions, (2)  reduce tariffs,  and (3)  promote
nondiscrimination either through most  favored nation clauses or via
multilateral rather than bilateral trade negotiations.  However,  the United
States delegation  to the London Conference  was  instructed to demand an
exemption  from any concessions  which  might undermine  the programs
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12,  1933, and the London conference  began June  12, 1933.  That  is,  1
month elapsed between the time the AAA initiated nationalistic
agricultural controls  and the time that U.S. trade negotiators  attempted
to pry  open the door to liberal world trade while simultaneously  holding
it shut to any concessions on agricultural trade.
The London Conference ended  in failure.  The  inability of the major
powers  to resolve currency issues or chronic imbalances  dominated  any
discussion of commercial disputes.  The London Conference  is  important
because the planning of the postwar economic  order was, in large part, a
reaction to  its failure  to resolve  these three problems.  The proposed
postwar solutions were three institutions: a Clearing Union, which  would
emerge as the IMF; an economic adjustment facility,  the World Bank;  and
a commercial regulatory  facility, the International  Trade  Organization.
Lacking any multilateral framework  for trade negotiations,  Roosevelt and
Hull spurred congressional  passage of the Trade  Agreements  Act of 1934
which provided the legislative basis  for all subsequent  trade policy.  The
Trade Act gave the President the power to negotiate reciprocal  trade
agreements.  The means  of negotiation was  bilateral, but Hull attempted
to employ most favored nation  clauses to make bilateral deals  as
multilateral as  possible.
Peek and Wallace collided in October  1933 after  Peek cut a  deal to
subsidize the sale of Pacific white wheat to China.  Peek and Wallace
clashed over a number of issues and, in December  1933, Roosevelt  asked
for Peek's resignation.  In compensation, Roosevelt named Peek as a
Special Trade Advisor.  This  move put Peek into direct conflict with
6 Kindleberger (1973)  and Peek (1936) portray  Hull  as tariff-obsessed.  Hull (1948)
portrays himself  in a better light.  He rightly viewed the  NRA and the AAA as severe
impediments  to international commercial  agreements,  and that the administrators of such
policies  "believed in cutting the United  States off from the  rest of the economic  world which
they regarded  as of little importance.  They wanted  to concentrate  on lifting  prices and
restoring  business  in this country by purely domestic measures.  As prices  rose, they felt the
need for import embargoes and higher tariffs to keep  out imports from abroad which would
interfere with the increasing price scale."  Also  see Kindleberger (1973)  on the motivation  for
the  U.S.  agricultural waiver.
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offering surplus cotton stocks at a fraction of cost.  Hull objected to such
an obvious departure  from the principles of nondiscrimination.8
Roosevelt sided with Hull, and Peek ultimately  resigned.'
Peek may have lost the battle over cotton subsidies,  but he won the war
for making the dumping of surplus commodities  on foreign markets  a
mainstay of U.S. agricultural  policy.  Dumping, or any form of price
discrimination,  creates the potential for arbitrage;  a nation could purchase
subsidized  U.S. exports  and reexport  them to the United  States for the
higher domestic price.  Arbitrage would simultaneously  undermine
domestic prices and give the arbitrageur a unit profit equal to the price
gap.  In August 1935, the  1933 AAA was amended to permit and finance
dumping.  Section 32 set aside 30 percent of customs revenues  for the
Secretary of Agriculture to  use to subsidize  agricultural exports.1A  To
prevent arbitrage and secure the insulation of domestic agriculture from
competitive  forces, section 22 allowed the executive  to impose import
quotas to prevent imports from "rending ineffective  or materially
interfering  with" domestic programs.  The 1933 Act had metamorphosed
?  Hull (1948)  notes,  "The greatest threat to the trade agreements  came not from foreign
countries, not from the Republicans,  not from certain manufacturers or growers,  but from
within the Roosevelt  Administration  itself, in the person of George  N. Peek.  In March  1934,
the President had named him Foreign  Trade Advisor.  If Mr. Roosevelt  had hit me between
the eyes  with a sledge  hammer he could  not have stunned me more  than by the
appointment."
*  According  to Hull (1948), "One basis  of our trade agreements  policy--equality  of
commercial treatment and opposition  to the numerous  sorts of discrimination  and
preference--would  have been openly violated by the Peek barter proposals.  Our program
undertook in a broad way  to provide  export facilities  for the more  burdensome surpluses
such as cotton,  tobacco,  lard, wheat, and automobiles,  by reducing discriminations and
preferences abroad and creating equality  in trade treatment."
'  Peek's book Why  Quit Our Own?  (1936)  is a tirade  against reciprocal  trade agreements
and production restrictions.  In the chapter  "The Sell  Out," he gives his view of reciprocal
trade agreements:
Secretaries Hull and Wallace got out their school books, gathered
around them a group that owned  the same school  books,  and started to
play a game  that was in their books  instead of the  game that was  in
progress.  Secretary  Hull could not recognize  that the  elaborate system
of exchange  controls,  quota systems,  restrictions and regulations on
trade which  had sprung up throughout the world were not panic
expedients but were reasoned  attempts to preserve monetary systems
and domestic  economies.
10 The value of 30 percent was employed because  30 percent of the U.S. population was
considered  to be involved  in  the agricultural sector in 1935.  Section 32 is still in effect  at the
30-percent level, although  the agricultural  portion of the population  today is only 2 percent.
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gained  legal priority over trade negotiations.  Of the broad powers
granted by the AAA, the nationalist  policy instruments came  to dominate
internationalist  instruments.  After  1935,
[t]hose in the government  concerned  with commercial  policy
could do little or nothing to influence the future course of farm
programs, which were of key importance  to  the New Deal.
Legislative  policies established  by Sections  22 and 32 were
regarded  as untouchable.  Accordingly,  the trade-agreements
program was made to conform  (Leddy,  1963).
All agreements subsequently  negotiated under  the authority of the Trade
Agreements  Act contained  a clause  exempting quantitative restrictions
linked to agricultural  programs.
The Wallace and Hull alliance was only with respect  to George  Peek, as
Wallace,  unlike Hull, did not trust the free operation  of market  forces.
In 1939, Wallace,  over Hull's  protests, successfully  defended the use of
section 32 to subsidize cotton exports.  Even  for Wallace,  there were
times when the political costs of holding surplus stocks outweighed  the
costs violating  internationalist  principles.
Agricultural Internationalism: The Ever-Normal  Granary
Henry A. Wallace  was a third-generation  Iowa  farm journalist  and was
well aware of the farmer's  complaint  of price volatility."  Wallace's
solution was to help  stabilize commodity  markets through  the
establishment  of an ever-normal  granary.  Wallace traced  this solution to
the Bible and the writings  of Confucius.12  To  Wallace,  the Commodity
Credit Corporation was an obvious  instrument for financing  and
managing  a domestic buffer  stock.  But a domestic buffer stock would not
solve the problem  of international  price volatility;  in fact, it would
exacerbate  it.  An international  buffer stock was needed.
"  This is an understatement  of the Wallaces;  see Lord (1972) and  Rosenof (1967).
1  In essence, it is a buffer stock scheme.  See  Newbery  and Stiglitz  (1981)  and Choi and
Johnson (1991).
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problems of commodity price volatility in the  1930's.  He argued that
primary products  were different from industrial  products.  Their relatively
price-inelastic demand and supply schedules  were vulnerable to stochastic
production and cyclical  income shocks and resulted in price  series of high
amplitude.  He concluded  that primary producers  had a legitimate
complaint about excess price  volatility and felt that  some form of
international buffer stock was required  to moderate  price  fluctuations.
Unless excess  price volatility could be damped,  producers were too prone
to lobby for the kinds of nationalistic agricultural policies  which  only
exacerbate  the problem by shifting domestic volatility to the international
market.  Keynes was rather critical of the existing  International Wheat
Agreement,  as he felt it discriminated  against  nonsignatory nations. 3
For commodity agreements  to work without massive stock accumulation,
Keynes  advocated  bringing long-term supply and demand  into  line by
eliminating high-cost  producers  in an orderly manner  with due notice.1 4
Keynes'  published work on commodity problems starts with a  1938 paper
presented at the Royal Economic Society meetings and published  in the
Economic Journal. August 30,  1938, Keynes sent a copy of the paper to
Wallace.  In the cover letter,  Keynes wishes  Wallace good  luck with
Canadian bilateral trade negotiations, and concludes  with the following
statement:
I am  a convinced advocate  of the general  principles
underlying your policy of a concerted government  policy
to average fluctuations  by an assisted scheme  of storage
(Keynes,  1980).
During 1940 and  1941, Keynes was involved with drafting  proposals for an
International  Clearing Union and in Anglo-American  negotiations  over
lend-lease.  During a visit  to Washington  in May  1941,  Keynes  met with
Dean  Acheson and Leo  Pasvolsky, among  others at the State Department.
At that meeting, Keynes expressed  his support  for some form of an ever-
normal granary.  According  to Keynes'  editor, Moggridge:
n13  Moreover, Argentina  and the United  States defected  from the agreement  shortly after
it was signed  in 1933.
"  The idea of international buffer stock  schemes was not popular with the British
Ministry of Agriculture,  which  claimed that all other Ministries of Agriculture desired
planned output (a  euphemism for organized  restriction), quotas, and fixed  prices.  In light  of
this predictably nationalistic complaint,  Harrod  (1951)  quotes Keynes  in a meeting  with the
Ministry as remarking "All Departments of Agriculture are rackets."
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highly ambitious,  but he felt that it was one which would
appeal to the Vice-President  [Henry  Wallace]  and  he
considered  that the fact that it was  difficult  and even
grandiose should not exclude it from the long-range
planning  involved in dealing with the surplus problem.
The reaction of Mr.  Acheson to this was  interested, but
cautious.  He gave the impression of not having thought
along those  lines before, and indeed at the end of the
meeting  he said that he felt  his mind was much clearer
now  for giving thought to  the problem as a whole....
Mr.  Pasvolsky was obviously interested  and attracted
from the outset.  He was particularly  concerned with the
reverse adjustments  which would be necessary after  the
war in cutting down  productive capacity which  had been
called into existence by the war but which  would not be
needed during  the peace.  He was also clearly  taken with
the idea of linking the problem of surplus accumulation
with that of postwar distribution  (Keynes,  1980).
Keynes  and Acheson maintained  an active correspondence  on the issue of
international  commodity agreements.  Keynes also  drafted several  briefs
on the International  Wheat Agreement  and was involved  in international
cotton  negotiations.  In  1942, Keynes shifted from  specific commodity
issues  to the more "grandiose" issue of how  to design an institution to
manage  an international  multicommodity "ever-normal  granary."  These
efforts were contributions  to the U.K. Treasury's  position papers  in the
Anglo-American  negotiations  over the institutional  framework  of the
postwar order.  The earliest  extant draft of his  paper, "The International
Control  of Raw Materials" was dated  April  1942  (republished  in Keynes,
1974 and  1980).  Both this draft and the draft of May  1942, contain the
heading:  "The internationalization  of Vice-President  Wallace's ever-
normal granary" (Keynes,  1980):
The  essence of the plan should be that  prices are subject
to  gradual changes  but are fixed  within a  reasonable
range over  short periods;  those producers who  find the
ruling price attractive being allowed  a gradual  expansion
at the expense of those who find  it unattractive.
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extreme  imbalance, output regulation would be required.15 Such a policy
would:
amount to an internationalization of the ever-normal
granary' proposals of Vice-President  Wallace, which  seem
to go to the root of the matter and are likely to promote
the general interest more completely  than can be claimed
for any projects which are primarily directed  to
restriction (Keynes,  1980, emphasis  in the original).
As Anglo-American  talks progressed,  Keynes'  commodity control
institution was  linked  to the Clearing Union  for financing.  As  the
Clearing Union emerged  as  the IMF, the commodity  control facility  was
dropped.  At Bretton Woods,  May  1944, a resolution was  adopted to
devise  means  to "bring about the orderly marketing of staple  commodities
at prices  fair to the producer and consumer  alike." 16
Towards a Postwar Order
War mobilization,  not the New Deal, ended the depression  in  the United
States.  The crisis in agriculture shifted from one of surpluses  and excess
capacity  to one of shortages  and supply constraints.  Although  the war
sharply raised crop  prices and farm  incomes, farmers  feared  that the end
of war-induced  scarcities and the revival  of production in competing
countries would result in an agricultural depression  as devastating  as the
one  following World  War  I.17  Farmers were hesitant  to risk expanding
production  to meet  the demands  of the war economy if a postwar  bust
were likely to  follow.  To  assuage  their concerns,  legislation in  1941  and
1942 extended parity-based  price supports to a wide range of commodities
(among them  turkeys, sweet potatoes,  tung nuts, and hemp), exempted
them  from war-time  price controls (to  110 percent  of parity),  and
guaranteed  price supports for 2 years  following the official end of
hostilities.  The 2-year  guarantee, however, did not remove  the threat of a
5 The idea that there is a corridor within which  classical  assumptions  hold and beyond
which quantity  adjustments  are required  is a motif that pervades Keynes'  work, see
Leijonhufvud's  (1981)  essay, "Effective Demand Failures."
f6  Bretton Woods  Conference,  Vol. I, pp. 937-42,  cited  in Brown (1950).
7  The  1920-22 agricultural  depression stimulated  the  political  demand for McNary-
Haugen-type legislation  and the formation  of the  farm bloc in  Congress.
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postwar policy discussion, in order of priority:  how to return domestic
policy to a peace time basis, and then, how to devise  rules for
international commodity trade.
1945 was a banner year for proposals  for a postwar agricultural  and trade
order.  In January  1945,  W.H. Jasspon donated  $12,500 to  the American
Farm Economic Association  [AFEA]  to fund a contest.  Entrants were
requested to write a paper: "A Price  Policy for Agriculture, Consistent
with Economic Progress, that Will Promote Adequate  and More  Stable
Income  from Farming."  There were 317 entries.  Awards were presented
in September  1945,  and the 18 winning papers were published  in the
November  1945 issue of the Journal  of Farm Economics.  First, second,
and third  prizes were awarded,  respectively,  to William H. Nicholls, then
of the University  of Chicago;  D. Gale Johnson,  also of the University  of
Chicago; and Frederick V. Waugh,  of USDA's  Bureau of Agricultural
Economics.  Fifteen  honorable mention awards were also granted.
AFEA President L.J. Norton, in his introduction to  the November  1945
issue,  summarizes  the policy suggestions  of the papers:
The papers logically  fall into two groups,  those written by
farmers and other  laymen; those written by  professional
economists.  Among  the former there  was a strong accent
in favor  of fixed prices, in many cases related  to  "cost of
production."  No definite plans were proposed  for
accomplishing this.  The desire of many farmers  for fixed
prices may be considered  as a wish for  security against
the effects  of fluctuating prices  and depression
accompanied  by severe price  declines.
The professional group of papers  included  a wide variety
of proposals.  In general the present  parity formula was
considered to  be outmoded  and the entire concept  of
parity was  held to be unworkable  by a number....  Very
little emphasis  was placed  on production  controls.
Among  the prize-winning  papers there  was a strong
accent on the desirability of general  measures  that would
maintain a vigorous and prosperous  general  economy,
greater freedom  in prices  of individual commodities  than
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type of "forward pricing" in order to guide  production,
and government  supplementary payments  to maintain
total returns from individual  products or total  overall
farm income.
The general trend of thought was  toward freer markets
accompanied  by measures  to support some minimum
level  of farm income.
There is  little discussion  of international trade in the winning papers.  To
claim that this absence is  evidence  of an isolationist or insular view  of
agriculture given  the topic of the contest,  its page constraints, and the
impending end to wartime supports would be  unfair.  Waugh is one  of
the few to explicitly  discuss the international  market:
A foreign trade  program.  A revival  of foreign trade will
be essential.  The best possible  domestic  nutrition
program will not provide adequate outlets  for wheat,
cotton, tobacco,  and other export crops.  The United
States should use  its influence  to bring about a general,
world-wide  relaxation of international trade barriers.  But
we  should recognize  that progress along  these lines  may
be slow and difficult.  Therefore,  we should also proceed
immediately to work out international  commodity
agreements aimed  at an orderly distribution of world
surpluses of the primary  export  commodities.  These
agreements  should  provide a  "buffer stocks" program to
even out fluctuations  in supplies.  They should also
include  measures to make  surpluses  available to
undernourished  populations in areas of chronic need.
Waugh's  comments  reflect an emerging  view in the Journal of Farm
Economics during the early and mid-1940's  that international  commodity
agreements  might provide a second-best solution to  the volatility of
international agricultural  markets.  But what transpired  during the
negotiations of the ITO and the  GATT (1945-50)  ultimately had little  to
do with internationalist  views  of Keynes, Wallace,  or the professional
economists  writing in the Journal of Farm Economics.  Rather, it was L.J.
Norton's "farmers and other laymen"--the  George Peeks of the world--and
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control of the postwar agenda for agriculture. 1s
1945 was  also a good  year for official  proposals  for the postwar order.
Four merit our attention.  In its report on policies  for economic  stability
in the postwar world, the League  of Nations strongly advocated
international agreements among  governments.  The greatest risk of a
return to the economic  nationalism policies  of the depression would  be
during the "transition  period," those few  years  during which  economies
would  attempt to shift from wartime to peacetime.
It seems  inevitable that the ad hoc uncoordinated
decisions  of individual governments  to deal with specific
problems  confronting them at that time (whether these
problems  relate to import controls, surplus stocks of
commodities,  or exchange  control  practices) will  be of a
defensive  rather than of an expansive  character, and that
these defensive  policies  embarked on in the  transition
period will  set the tone of international economic  policy
for a long time to come....  Short-run considerations  of
expediency  may from time to time appear to indicate a
temporizing  approach; the immediate difficulties  of bold
action may make the temporizing approach appear more
realistic than a bold and far-sighted  view.  Realism is,
however,  not to be confused with myopia  (League  of
Nations,  1945).
The League's prescription for "International  Anti-Depression  Measures
for Raw Material and Food Producing  Countries" follows  directly from
the Keynes-Wallace  formula: international buffer stocks with production
controls  as needed.
[C]ontrol  may prove necessary  as  a supplement to buffer
stocks  in order to preserve  the existing  pattern of
production and productive capacity  in the world rather by
international agreement  than by competition  among
governments  in the preservation of redundant capacity.
The justification is only valid so  long  as governments  are
resolved  to prevent the elimination  of the unprofitable.
1 Peek grasped  the realpolitik of international trade policy;  see  footnote 9 above.
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important  reason for protectionism,  because...  it would  very
greatly diminish, if not remove altogether, what has been  a real
risk in the past,  namely, that productive  capacity which  is  again
vitally requisite during a boom may be destroyed during a
depression  (League  of Nations,  1945).
Two points are important here.  First, because  national  governments  tend
to preserve  redundant and unprofitable  production capacity,  an
international agreement  is required to constrain  this behavior.  Second,
reducing price volatility will moderate both booms and busts.  Booms are
as much a problem  as busts, because  owners  of marginal  land cultivated
during a boom demand  protection against redundancy when normal
conditions return.  Protection  of redundant capacity  initiates a
cumulative process resulting in surplus production,  protectionist
pressures, and an increasing risk of a bust.
The U.S.  State Department's  proposal was  an exemplar  of Hullian
liberalism,  voicing strong support for the ITO.  However, there were
some  glaring exceptions:  in particular, sections  22  and 32 were  defended,
and there was support for international  commodity agreements  under
ITO control  (U.S.  Department of State  (1945),  pp.  13-23  in particular).
The USDA's program,  at least as it pertained  to trade  issues, championed
international  agreements.  The  influence of Keynes,  Waugh,  and Schultz,
among others,  is apparent  in its emphasis  on consumption  enhancement
and its aversion to production  control.  International  coordination  of
transfers  of surplus stocks  to households  or nations with  an "ineffective
demand" for food, but nutritional needs,  would, at one stroke,  help
alleviate  supply, demand,  and income imbalances.  Although the USDA
program was internationalist,  it left  a very  limited role  for the market in
international  trade, as  a liberal  trade order  in agriculture would  undercut
government  management  of domestic  agriculture  (U.S. Department of
Agriculture,  1945).  The consumption  enhancement  view of international
control  of agricultural  trade is also strongly  voiced  in the proposal  by the
Food and Agriculture Organization  of the United Nations (FAO)  for the
establishment  of a World  Food Board  (FAO, 1945).  One of the struggles
during 1945-46  was over which  international organization  would  have
control of international  commodity trade.  USDA lobbied for FAO
control, while State lobbied  for ITO management.  As  Brown (1950)
explains, on the issue of commodity agreements, the FAO
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do,  regarded such agreements  as necessary  exceptions  to
general rules of commercial  policy, to be rather
reluctantly accepted  and strongly  safeguarded against
abuse.  There has, moreover,  been a tendency for
governments,  even  those  of importing countries,  to send
representatives  to FAO deliberations who  are more
deeply  imbued with the point of view  of producer
interests than were the representatives  sent to the ITO
negotiations  by the same governments.  It seems  probable
that if the  ITO entered into force  this difference  in
attitude would  continue,  and that the ITO would tend to
emphasize  consumer interests, that it would  attempt to
minimize departure from more liberal trading policies,
and that it would  treat commodity  agreements  as
essentially  short-term devices  to meet  particular
emergencies,  rather than as permanent and desirable
methods  of conducting trade.  Such an attitude would be
in accordance  with the spirit and provisions  of the ITO
Charter as a whole.  The FAO would  probably continue
to see  in commodity  agreements  an important technical
device  for the achievement  of positive objectives,  such  as
improved nutrition and the sale of "surplus"  products to
depressed  areas at special  prices.
The Truman administration witnessed  the origin of the cold  war.  Henry
Wallace,  Secretary of Commerce  until  1946, split with Truman over U.S.
relations with the Soviet Union.  After a year as editor of The New
Republic,  Wallace reestablished  and then headed the ticket  of the
Progressive  Party in the  1948 presidential election.  Among  other points,
Wallace  stressed cooperation  and trade with the Soviets  and
strengthening the power of the United  Nations.  In particular, he
advocated U.N. administration  of foreign aid.  As the political  climate
polarized,  Wallace and advocates  of internationalism became  increasingly
suspect.
The internationalist perspective  in commercial  policy  met a similar end.
Internationalists argued for adoption of a code of international rules
which  would  constrain economic  nationalism  and reduce the risk of
depression and military conflict.  The United  States as the new  hegemon
faced a  decision  between  binding itself and all others to a system  of rules
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a marginal loss of legal leverage  over other countries.  The nationalist
view in the United States  ultimately prevented  the Congress from even
voting on the ITO charter, and by default the GATT, which was,  and
remains, very weak on agriculture,  became  the code governing
international trade.19
Despite the demise  of the ITO, the prospect of international  commodity
agreements  remained alive and several were signed  in the late  1940's.
However, the idea of an international buffer stock for the  purpose of
price stabilization surrendered  too much national sovereignty  to an
international committee  for the United States to consider.  The buffer
stock proposal withered  away leaving the shell of an international
commodity agreement stripped of its international public good
rationale."  Arguments  for surplus  disposal and consumption
enhancement also remained, but they were increasingly  nationalist in
scope.  The emergence  and ultimate  permanence  of the "temporary" Food
for Peace program (1954)  is perhaps the clearest manifestation  of
agricultural nationalism generating  bilateral government-controlled
commodity trade.  The other export programs  of the United States,  as
well as those of the European Community  (EC), are also derivative  of the
demands of domestic producers  for a controlled  environment.
Conclusion
The decision not to bind agricultural  trade to  some form of international
governance  in the late  1940's still affects  the conduct  of agricultural  trade,
its empirical analysis,  and prospects  for its liberalization.
9 Covering  the debates  over agriculture in the ITO  and the origins  of the agricultural
exceptions  of the GATT would require a paper at least double  the  length of the present text.
Readers can  turn to two  excellent  sources:  Brown (1950)  and Johnson (1950).  Both authors
served  as economic  advisors  on international trade issues  at the  State Department under the
Truman administration, and both  books were published when  the  ITO was  still  a  live  issue
and cover many issues  not covered  in later works.  For agriculture  under the  GATT,
Warley's (1990)  article  picks up the narrative where this chapter concludes.
*  Poor mechanism design  is the weak  point of any commodity agreement.  The
International Wheat Agreement,  initiated in 1949, was  the only agreement of  any importance,
and its performance was fairly comical.  See  Farnsworth (1957).
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The exemption  of agriculture from the rules of the game has  led to
policies of competitive  bilateralism which have proved destructive  in the
1980's and, unless constrained,  are likely to become  even more destructive
in the  1990's.  Bilateralism remains the dominant mode of international
agricultural trade.  There is  much more government  control  of
international trade than our standard assumptions of a law of one price
and continuous and twice-differentiable  functions would lead us to
deduce.  Almost all quotas and government export  programs  are bilateral,
and bilateral trade short-circuits the Walrasian auctioneer  who implicitly
solves the equations of our trade models.21  One should seriously
question the results of analyses which require a suspension of belief in
what we know about agricultural trade: the assumptions undergirding
one-price,  Armington, and net trade models result in elegant but
implausible representations  of observed  conduct.
Stability and Liberalization
In the United States, free trade in agriculture  has  not been a  politically
correct position since  1933.  This political reality cannot  be assumed
away.  Current proposals  for agricultural trade  liberalization  may be too
liberal for national governments to tolerate if liberalization  increases  the
variance  of agricultural prices and farm  incomes within their borders.
What Gale Johnson  warned of in  1950 still holds true:
Regardless of which proposal  [for effecting  price
stabilization]  is accepted,  this country must stand ready
to consider  the desires and aspirations  of agricultural
producers  for greater economic  stability.  If these desires
are not taken into account, the possibility of achieving
liberal trade throughout  the world is sharply reduced.
The possibility  is even further reduced  today because  the United States is
no longer the victorious hegemon that it was in 1945.  Too little attention
has been paid to the issue  of price stability, or the political demand for it,
in the context of liberalized agricultural  trade.  The  plans for a
Commodity  Control or World Food Board were certainly idealistic, but
21  These issues  have been the focus of the author's  recent research (Skully, 1990,  1991,
1992).
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public sector,  were not dueling with phantoms.  They recognized  and
attempted to  devise  a means to reduce  price volatility, which  they viewed
as  the core cause  of agricultural nationalism.
Keynes  and Wallace  identified an international political-market  failure
and attempted to construct an international public good:  an institution
that would  (1)  lessen  the demand for nationalistic policies  by (a)  reducing
price volatility and (b) resolving,  multilaterally, effective  demand failures
(food  aid); and (2) credibly enforcing  rules to constrain the external
effects  of domestic  agricultural policies  from spilling  over into the
international market.
Designing  or realizing such  an international public good  may be
impossible,  but it seems  to  embody what many current partial
liberalization proposals are groping toward.  The current Hobbesian
circus  of retaliatory bilateralism, with the United States and the EC at
center stage,  is too self-destructive  to  be sustainable.  The risk is that
agricultural retaliation is at least as likely to spread to other areas of
commerce  and finance  as it is  to be resolved  by a cease-fire  and an
agreement to play fair in the future; no one has  played  fair in the past.
The proposed alternative of liberalized agriculture trade, as long  as  the
volatility problem persists,  is equally  unsustainable, not to mention
politically unacceptable.  The Uruguay Round  of the GATT is the first
time since  the late  1940's that proposals  on rules  for agricultural trade
have been seriously  discussed  multilaterally.  The  negotiations  on
agriculture have limited themselves  to evaluating  alternative amendments
to the rather weak GATT  foundations.  The GATT, after all, was  the
default option to the  ITO.  The agricultural diplomacy of the  1940's, as
outlined in this chapter, entertained a much broader portfolio  of options
than we  have permitted ourselves  today, although we  face  essentially  the
same problems,  and some  of these  options may  contain solutions  or
alternatives to the  current stalemate.
"  Production entitlement  guarantees and trade distortion equivalents  address the second
goal,  but the price volatility problem  remains.
" A constitutional  convention  rather than amendment  to the existing  order may  be
needed.  Jackson  (1990)  discusses  the establishment of a World Trade Organization, and
Bhagwati (1991)  alludes  to constitutional questions  in his analysis.
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